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Statutory Union Recognition Provisions as Stimulants to Employer Anti-Unionism in 
Three Anglo-Saxon Countries 
 
Introduction 
In periods of union weakness, largely resultant from employer opposition, unions have 
campaigned for, and often achieved, the creation of legal or regulatory provisions to 
facilitate the gaining of union recognition (UR). In this way, unions have sought to short-
circuit their industrial or economic weakness vis-à-vis employers by campaigning in the 
political arena to gain state-supported provisions to compel employers to negotiate with 
them. However, such provisions for gaining UR in Britain, Eire, and the United States 
(US) are argued to be a major factor in helping to stimulate employer opposition to UR 
campaigns, transforming latent employer opposition to labour unionism into active 
opposition, and further deepening existing employer anti-unionism (EA-U) towards UR 
campaigns. So, for non-union employers, the creation of statutory or state-supported 
union recognition provisions (SURPs) represents a transmutation in the status of the 
‘union threat’ from hypothetical into potential and potential into actual. Employers, 
then, feel compelled to take preventative, corrective and retaliatory actions. Such 
actions have been broadly successful in pushing back and extinguishing or defeating UR 
campaigns. This phenomenon has two further important facets in the three countries at 
hand. First, the extent of employer opposition and its effectiveness is argued to be 
largely attributable to both the weakly supportive nature of the UR laws and wider 
public policy vis-à-vis labour unionism. Second, the insertion of weak UR provisions into 
national systems characterised by minimal state intervention in industrial relations 
(compared to a number of continental European countries) further strengthens 
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employers’ ability to frustrate union attempts to gain UR using SURPs. Herein lies a 
paradox. In periods of union weakness, unions are arguably in greater need of statutory 
and governmental support to help redress the accentuated power imbalance vis-à-vis 
employers, but this stimulates further employer antipathetic action. Consequently, 
unions may then need even greater degrees of support (legislative, policy) but they are 
unable to compel this from governments/states because of their underlying weakness 
and the political insensitivity of political parties to labour unionism.  
 
By contrast, in other, non-Anglo-Saxon, countries such as those found in continental 
Europe or Scandinavia, anti-unionism of non-union employers exists but its context is 
sufficiently different to render inclusion in a comparative analysis of Britain, Eire and the 
US less than worthwhile. This difference historically concerns far greater pro-collectivist 
and pro-worker state intervention in employment relations (e.g., forums for 
consultation and co-determination, a positive right to strike), far greater pro-worker 
public policy like support for centralised bargaining arrangements, and a political centre 
of gravity which is closer to social democracy than anything that exists in Britain, Eire, 
and the US. Often there is no perceived need for SURPs applicable to individual 
employers and sectors in these non-Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, sectors which 
are elsewhere believed elsewhere to exhibit propensities towards non-unionism by dint 
of both employee and employer preference like retail, leisure and IT are well unionised 
and covered by collective bargaining. Financial and other incentives to de-unionisation 
and derecognition are lessened by the mandatory application of collective bargained 
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agreements to the pay and conditions of non-union workers. Thus, the salience of 
comparing Britain, Eire, and the US rests on their largely voluntarist or collective laissez 
faire industrial relations systems. However, it also rests on the employment relationship 
in Eire being relatively more regulated than that in Britain and that in Britain being 
relatively more regulated than that in the US, albeit within a common neo-liberal 
political and economic system across the three countries (particularly for Britain and 
Eire since the 1980s). Consequently, Britain, Eire and the US provide a comparison 
involving similarity and variability. 
 
This paper poses the preceding argument as a contention to be explored in order to 
begin to understand the motives, dynamics and context of EA-U. It begins by laying out 
the contention and its contexts in greater detail before examining the respective 
situations in each country. The US case is discussed after Britain and Eire because it 
departs somewhat from the general tenor of the contention. EA-U towards UR 
campaigns is measured by instances of union substitution and suppression in Britain and 
Eire and by ‘unfair labour practices’ (ULPs) in the US which are solely concerned with the 
SURP and primarily comprise discrimination or firings for union activity and refusals to 
bargain.  
 
The reason why the argument is expressed as contention (and not a hypothesis to be 
tested) is two-fold. The first reason concerns the nature of the data and information 
deployed. In the case of Britain, data was gathered as a part of an research project 
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spanning 1990-2007 on UR campaigns and generated through fieldwork (interviews with 
employed union officers responsible for UR campaigns in the twenty biggest unions) and 
deploying secondary sources like union documentation and journals, the determinations 
from the Central Arbitration Committee (the body charged with administering the SURP) 
and newspaper sources through the Nexis database and those practitioner periodicals 
which focus on unions. In the case of Eire, data was gathered through the 
determinations of the state bodies charged with administering the employment 
disputes procedures (the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) and the Labour Court) and 
the Industrial Relations News1, a fortnightly periodical of industrial relations, and other 
indigenous press reports through the Nexis database for the same period. Finally, in the 
case of the US, a review of the salient literature was deployed instead because the 
relevant period following the introduction of its SURP vastly predated the compatible 
period for Britain and Eire, making the generation of comparable data extremely 
difficult, especially given the size of the economy in the US.  
 
In the cases of Britain and Eire, the data generated has a high level of inclusiveness of 
reported incidences of EA-U, where this concerns documentation in the public domain. 
In the case of Britain, this was supplemented by interviews. As incidences were self-
selecting, no population sample was created and not all incidences will have been 
captured (owing to deficiencies in union and journalistic reporting systems), it is, 
                                                          
1 This periodical has a high level of inclusion of salient developments due to the small size of the 
‘industrial relations community’ in Eire, the periodical’s developed contact network and its high 
reputation.  
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therefore, difficult to establish population sizes for the data. It would be wrong to 
simply conclude that the population size is all employers in both countries, for some will 
already recognise unions and others being never face any prospect of union activity to 
gain UR. Consequently, the data should be regarded as highly representative without 
being fully inclusive. In the case of the US, the literature is based on data from the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and episodic, spatially delimited studies of the 
context for gaining voluntary UR. Because of the former, it cannot be concluded that all 
incidences of EA-U will have been captured so again a population size cannot be 
established. Nonetheless, the information for the US can be taken as being highly 
indicative as seeking UR through the NLRB accounts for c.80% of all UR attempts by 
unions.    
 
The second reason why the argument is expressed as a contention relates to the periods 
and contexts of the SURPs. While the US SURP dates from the inter-war period as part of 
the Roosevelt administration’s self-initiated reform programme (the ‘New Deal’), 
concerned with social cohesion, political stability and economic growth, those in Britain 
and Eire date from the new millennium and are the outcome of pressure group politics 
upon government under neo-liberalism. Moreover, levels of extant EA-U to UR 
campaigns, prior to any SURP impact, were different in the three countries; greatest in 
the US, and substantial in Britain with Eire being in between but more akin to Britain. 
These factors mean that variables would need to be constructed in order to take 
account of these differences in order to make analysis grounded and robust. But, as per 
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above, the data does not lend itself to this.  Consequently, the discussion and conclusion 
are of a more suggestive nature, where it should be borne in mind that the size of the 
labour forces are respectively c150m (US), c30m (Britain) and c2m (Eire) in the new 
millennium as a rough measure for comparison.  
 
Conceptualising Union Weakness and Employer Anti-Unionism 
Formal recognition of unions by employers as bargaining partners in co-determining the 
wage-effort bargain is one of the key organisational blocks of labour unionism. Thus, 
procedural agreements provide the basis for concluding substantive agreements 
through collective bargaining. Under national systems of industrial relations marked by 
voluntarism (or collective laissez faire) and formally decentralised and disaggregated 
employer power and authority structures,2 UR provides unions with the firm-level 
organisational rights to defend and advance members’ interests, notwithstanding the 
need to construct effective bargaining power and build political support for labour 
unionism. Within such systems, labour unionism is very much – indeed, necessarily – 
more dependent upon its own independently generated resources in order to defend 
and advance members’ interests in relation to employer and state regulatory agencies. 
Following from this, periods of relative union weakness present unions with particular 
challenges because of their predicament of resource self-sufficiency under this type of 
regulatory regime. Here union weakness is characterised by indifference or hostility 
from government, state and employers, which is underpinned by changes in labour and 
                                                          
2 The force of these features has been accentuated by the ascendant hegemony of neo-
liberalism.  
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product markets. Faced with shrunken political leverage with government, diminished 
membership resources – fewer members, decreased membership attachment, lower 
union consciousness, reduced willingness to mobilise collectively and the like - and 
decreased qualitative and quantitative bargaining power with employers,3 unions have 
pressed for the creation of SURPs to facilitate gaining UR.4 In so doing, unions campaign 
in the political arena not only to gain agreement from progressive parties (e.g. labour or 
social democratic parties) to adopt SURP policies but also to put these parties into office 
in order to implement SURP polices. This strategy of campaigning for regulatory reform 
attempts to resolve unions’ industrial weakness, in recognition of this weakness being 
largely attributable to successful employer mobilising strategies of opposition (anti-
unionism, non-unionism), as well as use political means by which to help rebuild 
industrial strength. What is particularly noticeable about this strategy is that labour 
unions have spurned their traditional suspicion of reliance on statutory support and 
legal intervention and fought shy of engaging in direct, bilateral confrontation with 
employers in battles where there is a marked asymmetry of power.   
 
But union success in obtaining SURPs has not been matched by consequent success in 
gaining UR itself. The major factor explaining this has been employer behaviour, where 
the creation, introduction and availability of SURPs have helped to: a) create employer 
opposition to labour unionism because of the prospect of facing consequent UR 
                                                          
3 Cf. Batstone (1988) on sources of union power: disruptive capacity, labour scarcity and political 
influence. 
4 Of course, SURPs are not solely attributable to union action. In this regard, the peculiarity of 
the US vis-à-vis Britain and Eire will be examined below.  
 8 
campaigns; b) stimulate the transformation of what was previously dormant or latent 
employer antipathy to labour unionism into active, tangible opposition as a result of 
hypothetical, potential, expected or actual UR campaigns; and c) further stimulate and 
deepen existing active and tangible EA-U with regard to UR campaigns. Predictably, this 
employer opposition is generally effective (see, for example, Cooke 1985a, b), and not 
just because of superior financial, ideological and organisational resources but also 
because of the ability to exercise these in de jure and de facto unregulated manners. By 
contrast, the relatively decentralised nature of the industrial systems means that 
structural obstacles exist to labour unionism aggregating its power. Moreover, UR 
campaigns are almost necessarily characterised by nascent, not mature, workplace 
unionism, making it, arguably, more susceptible to EA-U. These employer actions then 
represent counter-mobilisation to defend their interests, defined in terms of rights of 
private property and managerial prerogative, and viewed through their worldview of 
unitarism by way of capital ownership and possession of management expertise. 
Moreover, in recent times, the hegemony of unitarism amongst employers has been 
extended through the ascendancy of HRM, which in turn has helped create a societal 
environment in which it is not politically unacceptable and not economically cost-laden 
for employers to behave in a unitarist manner. Indeed, there is legitimacy for taking 
action to prevent the prospect of employers ‘gaining’ uncompetitive ‘disadvantage’ 
through UR.  
 
Statutory Union Recognition Procedures as Facilitators of Employer Anti-Unionism 
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What is particularly important in facilitating EA-U is that the SURPs are enabling 
provisions, for they do not guarantee UR per se. Rather, they provide for UR if a 
procedure is passed through and if certain criteria are met. This is more important than 
any particular characteristic of SURPs for it allows employer interference to prevent or 
weaken the union’s case in the critical arena of the workplace where union membership 
and worker support exist and where the employer’s strength is dominant. 
Consequently, the promise or potential of SURPs for unions gaining UR with non-union 
employers is unrealised, either in getting to the point of an application or during the 
determination of the application. On top of this, the criteria are often exacting5 and the 
procedures allow for de jure employer interference as both employers and unions can 
be charged with ULPs.  
 
At a conceptual level, the existence of SURPs can be taken by non-union employers to 
pose a threat because, despite its varied but weak complexion in the three countries, it 
offers the probability of stimulating fresh, and reinvigorating existing, UR activity and 
provides an avenue through which to channel this activity which fundamentally 
questions the managerial prerogative. To non-union employers, SURPs then signal a 
hostile and aggressive act against capital and for labour, even though no mainstream 
political party or state apparatus in any of the three countries has ever displayed the 
                                                          
5 This is attributable to employer action: having accepted the realpolitik that SURPs would be 
created, employers, through lobbying, successfully ensured that the SURPs would be as 
‘business-friendly’ as possible (see, for example, Gall 2004a:254 and Gross 1974, 1981, 1995). 
Following from this, a number of authors like Ewing et al. (2003) and Moore (2004) have argued 
that the complexion of the SURPs allows and facilitates employer interference and resistance.  
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political ideology or political will to legislate for a SURP that would justify such employer 
anguish (such as one which gave workers an inalienable right to UR for individual 
workers or a simple collective of workers. i.e., two or more workers). Moreover, the 
degree of employer anguish particularly focuses on the use of law or regulation, rather 
than just public policy support, for UR. 
 
The means by which non-union employers mobilise and utilise their resources are well-
documented, ranging from the ‘velvet glove’ to the ‘iron fist or union substitution to 
union suppression which reward non-unionism and imposes costs on union members 
respectively (see Gall 2004b). The three situations in which the processes of employer 
mobilisation occur are hypothetical, potential and actual. In the hypothetical, the 
employer is unaware of any specific unionisation activities (internal or external) but 
believes that the prospect and existence of the SURPs are likely to stimulate attempts to 
undertake unionisation and recognition activities because of the existence of grievances 
and underlying discontent within their workforce. Initiatives are then taken to pre-empt 
such activities. In the potential, the employer is aware of some recent attempts at 
unionisation activities (internal or external) and believes that the prospect and existence 
of SURPs are likely to further stimulate or reinvigorate attempts to increase union 
membership with the express aim of gaining UR. Initiatives are then taken to pre-empt 
their return or further development. In the actual, the employer is keenly aware of 
current attempts at unionisation and recognition campaigning, and believes that the 
prospect and existence of SURPs are likely to further stimulate or reinvigorate attempts 
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to increase union membership and gain UR. Moreover, the employer believes that the 
SURPS will tip the balance in favour of the union resulting ultimately in the granting of 
legal UR. Initiatives are then taken to end the current unionisation and UR campaigns. 
The paper now proceeds to examine the contention in the three countries.  
 
Employer Anti-Unionism in Britain 
Prior to 1995, the extent of non-unionism grew by virtue of unions’ inability to organise 
new, greenfield sites (Millward et al. 2000). This inability was more closely related to 
unions’ limited ‘reach’ – both orientation towards greenfield sites and the resources 
deployed therein (Heery et al. 2000, Snape 1994)- rather than EA-U there. De-
recognition had also been growing (Gall and McKay 1994) while the few attempts to 
gain new UR agreement were met by a high degree of EA-U (Gall 1993). Between 1995 
and 2007, union density fell from 32.6% to 28.0% and from 21.6% to 16.1% in the 
private sector (Mercer and Notley 2008:17, 19). From 1995 onwards, two significant 
processes were set in train. Firstly, it became clear that the Labour Party would win the 
forthcoming general election and legislate on its policy of establishing a SURP where a 
majority of the workforce wished it, which it did in 1999 (Employment Relations Act 
1999) with the SURP ‘going live’ in 2000. However, this did not mark a move away from 
collective laissez faire (Smith and Morton 2001). Secondly, the TUC spearheaded the 
promulgation of ‘union organising’, leading to its relatively wide adoption. 
Consequently, union activity to win new UR agreements increased markedly as a result 
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of the ability to operate more successfully by dint of the more conducive environment 
(Gall 2004a, Table 1).  
 
Table 1 (columns 2,3,5) shows that in absolute numbers, the level of EA-U increases 
from a low base to the point (2000-02) of the introduction of a SURP and the apex of the 
number of UR campaigns before falling back in line with the decreasing number of UR 
campaigns. However, neither introduction of the SURP nor the rise in UR campaigns led 
to a relative and sustained increase in EA-U across the period (column 5), and by the end 
of the period, it remained broadly at the same level as at the start. Nonetheless, from 
1995 – when it became Labour would win the election and legislate for a SURP – to 1998 
– when the  (pre-Bill) White Paper for the SURP was published, the relative level of EA-U 
increased. Table 1 also shows that the deployment of strikes and strike threats to gain 
UR increased in absolute terms before falling back to the level of the early 1990s by 
2007, being influenced by the overall decline in strikes and the availability of a SURP 
while, when correlated to the number of UR campaigns in relative terms, fell from 1990 
to 2007. The number of UR campaigns rose considerably from 1990 to 2001, before 
falling back by 2007 (but not to pre-1995 levels). Meantime, the number of new UR 
agreements follows the same pattern in absolute numbers of substantial increase to 
2000-02 but in relative terms, the number of agreements gained as a proportion of 
campaigns run experienced a substantial fall from the 1999-2001 period. 
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Table 1: Union Tactics and Employer Tactics in Recognition Campaigns, 1990-2007  
Year Total 
number of 
EA-U 
incidents  
Number of  
employers  
using EA-U 
tactics  
Number of strikes / strike 
threats used to try to gain UR 
(% of UR campaigns both used 
in) 
Number of UR campaigns 
run (% affected by EA-U 
tactics) 
Number of new UR agreements 
signed (% of which campaigns for UR 
successful) 
1990 17 11 3  /4 (10%) 71 (15%) 49 (69%) 
1991 19 10 2  /3 (5% ) 99 (10%) 76 (76%) 
1992 13 9 3  /3 (7%) 83 (11%) 56 (67%) 
1993 20 10 2  /3 (6%) 88 (11%) 57 (65%) 
1994 25 11 3  /2 (7%) 71 (15%) 27 (38%) 
1995 35 18 3  /3 (6%) 109 (17%) 88 (81%) 
1996 55 31 2  /2 (3%) 159 (19%) 86 (54%) 
1997 78 52 3  /3 (3%) 207 (25%) 109 (53%) 
1998 113 68 2  /4 (2%) 296 (23%) 128 (43%) 
1999 143 85 4  /6 (2%) 665 (13%) 365 (55%) 
2000 160 107 8  /11 (2%) 1097 (10%) 525 (48%) 
2001 163 101 7  /10 (1%)  1489 (7%) 685 (46%) 
2002 203 113 6  /9 (1%) 1138 (10%) 388 (34%) 
2003 155 98 5  /8 (2%) 704 (14%) 259 (37%) 
2004 75 57 4  /4 (1%) 589 (10%) 239 (41%) 
2005 45 30 3  /3 (2%) 276 (11%) 122 (44%) 
2006 40 25 3  /4 (3%) 222 (11%) 83 (37%) 
2007 39 23 3  /3 (2%) 241 (10%) 94 (39%) 
Totals  1398 859 66  /85 (2%) 7604 (11%) 3436 (45%) 
Notes: Column data is not exclusive of each other. For example, a union may experience EA-U, threaten a 
strike to gain UR and gain UR. EA-U incidents are single instances of employer anti-unionism. 
 
 
Therefore, Table 1 provides some broad support for the contention but suggests that in 
the case of Britain, refinement is needed. Thus, in absolute terms, the level of EA-U does 
not fall below the pre-1995 level after 2000. However, in relative terms it does but 
where the highest level of EA-U is in the period of the creation of the SURP and the run-
up to its introduction rather than its availability per se. This suggests that a higher 
proportion of employers subject to UR campaigns sought to resist it in the window of 
opportunity before 2000 while, proportionately, fewer did after 2000. Yet, this must be 
balanced by the recognition that many more in absolute numbers resisted when faced 
with UR campaigns after 2000. The fall in the number of UR campaigns and new UR 
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agreements (along with the success rate) after the apex of 2000-1 represents arguably a 
combination of, on the one hand, union fatigue and the paucity of union resource after 
initial investment in UR campaigns, and on the other, the decline in the extant 
proportion of more amenable employers and the rise in the extant proportion of less 
amenable employers, whereby unions have gained success amongst the former and 
then moved to try to win UR from the latter (Gall 2007). Amongst the latter, pre-
emptive actions to ward off unions from mounting UR campaigns would seem to have 
been successful. Within these shifts, the decline in strike and strike threat usage is not 
indicative of less EA-U but availability of recourse to a SURP. Finally, the EA-U is more 
associated with actual and expected, rather than hypothetical, campaigns (Gall 2004b). 
The contention of SURPs stimulating EA-U is also broadly supported by other research 
(see, for example, Ewing et al. 2003, Heery 2000, Heery and Sims 2003, 2006, Moore 
2004) and consistent with growing EA-U attitudes (Cully et al. 1999:87-89, Kersley et al. 
2006:113-1156). For these reasons, the union movement has lobbied for changes to the 
SURP, achieving very minor reforms in the Employment Relations Act 2004. 
 
Employer Anti-Unionism in Eire7  
In Eire, no political party displays an anti-union weltanschauung (cf. Britain, US), and 
unions are (relatively influential) social partners at the societal level (Gunnigle et al. 
                                                          
6 Unfortunately, the fourth Workplace Employment Relations Survey (Kersley et al. 2006:113-
114) only measures the preponderance by certain types of employer size and ownership 
structure towards anti-unionism in terms of discouraging union membership. Moreover, this 
takes place in both recognised and non-recognised workplaces. The same is true for both Eire 
and the US in as much as there are no large scale national surveys which measure EA-U. 
7 As the case of Eire is relatively less well-known, a more detailed background is provided. 
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2001). Nonetheless, there is relatively little legal regulation of the employment 
relationship, with the tradition of voluntarism pronounced. In this context, and with the 
ascendancy of employer power, the extent of UR has fallen in over the period under 
study (Gunnigle et al. 2002:8, Roche 2001:44). D’Art and Turner (1999), McGovern 
(1989) and Turner et al. (1997) recorded increasing EA-U since the early 1980s to 
granting UR, resulting in growing recourse to the Labour Court and striking. The rise in 
non-unionism resulted also from the establishment of new, non-union workplaces, 
where union avoidance on greenfield sites was marked (Flood and Toner 1997, Gunnigle 
et al. 2002:10, Gunnigle et al. 2005, Roche 2001:46, 50). Opposition ranged from 
substitution to suppression, despite moves to accommodate to employers through 
sweetheart, partnership and partial recognition agreements. This downward trend in UR 
matches the decrease in union density, falling from 62% in 1980 to 35% in 2005, with 
private sector density of 21% in 2005 (EIRO 2002, 2005). 
 
Despite union pressure in the mid- to late-1990s to move to statutory underpinning for 
collective bargaining (the ‘duty to bargain’ policy) rather than UR per se, the voluntarist 
and non-legal approach deploying the Labour Court and LRC continued. But the Ryanair 
dispute (Roche 1998) increased union resolve to gain a strengthened procedure. This 
bore fruit in 1999, leading to the Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 2001. Although the 
voluntarist approach was retained, the Labour Court was now able to issue legally 
binding recommendations compelling employers to bargain with their unionised 
employees where an employer rejects the revised and extended voluntary recognition 
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process or deliberately abuses it. While this voluntary process can take up to two years, 
the Labour Court’s recommendation exists for one-year initially and, if unresolved, a 
final binding recommendation can be issued. The unions did not favour adopting the 
British form of SURP, believing protracted legal disputes would occur, derecognition 
would be stimulated and inward investment discouraged. As such, the ‘right to bargain’ 
constitutes a dispute resolution procedure, and not a SURP providing for non-temporary 
representation. However, it does represent a de facto albeit peculiar SURP, with which 
the union movement soon expressed disappointment with its outcomes (D’Art and 
Turner 2003:234). Consequently, it sought to strengthen the procedure for gaining 
bargaining rights and UR, now moving to adopt the British form of SURP in 2002, while 
maintaining the ‘right to bargain’ legislation but with a shortened time scale. As part of 
the negotiations for the next social pact, the former demand was won (through the 
2004 revised Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001) and all the social partners 
recognised that this was unlikely to be a final settlement given the influence of 
developments in the European Union’s social agenda.  
 
The extent of EA-U can be judged by the volume of Labour Court cases, strikes for UR, 
and reports of salient employer behaviour alongside the number of UR campaigns 
outwith the state procedures. Since the introduction of the new procedures (voluntary, 
‘right to bargain’ and revised ‘right to bargain’), union activity has increased significantly 
in seeking UR using the state-sponsored provisions (Labour Court 1992-2007, EIRO 2002, 
Tables 2 and 3). Thus, in regard of the LRC for example, between May 2000 and October 
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2001, 28 applications were made while between October 2001 and September 2002, 
this number doubled (EIRO 2002). However, the result of the applications, most of 
which have not gone through the full procedure including the ‘right to bargain’, is poor, 
and unions were concerned that employers were using the procedures to lawfully 
engage in delay and obfuscation (EIRO 2002) as well as take advantage of the lowered 
ability of unions to take industrial action within the procedures. In addition, both Roche 
(2001) and EIRO (2005) noted a hardening of EA-U attitudes.  
 
In terms of Labour Court cases for gaining new UR agreements (Table 2), the decline to 
the mid- to late-1990s indicates the difficulties unions experienced in bringing forward 
strong cases due to EA-U. With the strengthening of the SURP, the number of cases 
increases towards 2006. Although the Labour Court makes quasi-binding 
recommendations, there is only a 30% compliance rate (Gunnigle et al. 2002:235), and 
this level of employer resistance to granting UR is paralleled in LRC cases (D’Art and 
Turner 2003:127, 234) since 2000. EA-U here comprised denial of access to workers, and 
an array if union suppression and substitution tactics (D’Art and Turner 2005:129). 
Collectively, these factors concerning EA-U have led a poor union success rate for the 
period 2004-06 where the SURP provisions are now ostensibly the strongest they have 
ever been and a dramatic fall in applications in 2007 (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Labour Court Cases on Union Recognition, 1990-2007 
Year 
19 
90 
19
91 
19
92 
19
93 
19
94 
19
95 
19
96 
19
97 
19
98 
19
99 
20
00 
20
01 
20
02 
20
03 
20
04 
20
05 
20
06 
20
07 
UR  
cases  6 22 13 10 17 11 9 12 7 10 7 8 5 18 23 34 
 
36 
 
7 
Cases  
concerning  
gaining  
new UR 4 17 10 10 10 8 6 6 4 6 4  6  5  16  22 28 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
7 
Cases of UR 
recommended 3 17 10 10 9 7 6 5 3 5 1  0  3  9 2 4 
 
3 
 
0 
Source: Gunnigle et al. (2002:11) for years 1990-1999 for rows three and four, and the Labour Court for all 
other data, with advice from Niall Cullinane (University of Galway) on interpreting data categories since 
2001 in the light of the ‘right to bargain’ legislation.  
Note: The number of cases and recommendations are not synonymous with the number of applications 
for a number of applications were withdrawn because of developments in the voluntary arena or were 
discounted by the Labour Court. 
 
 
Despite the SURPs in Eire being weaker in de jure and de facto terms than those which 
exist in Britain and the US, two points are salient. For employers, there is still a purpose 
and incentive to mobilise against UR applications because the newer procedure exhibits 
a greater propensity to force them recognise and bargain with unions, and unions have 
been stimulated to use the procedure so that their recognition activities are greater 
than has hitherto been the case. For the unions, despite the procedure’s limitations, 
they now potentially have some further leverage over EA-U than was hitherto the case 
and this is an incentive to organise. Moreover, it is discernible that the level of EA-U has 
increased as the SURPs have become relatively more pernicious to non-union 
employers’ interests. Indeed, Table 3 broadly shows this, where the anticipation of a 
SURP, the existence of a SURP itself and the attempts to strengthen the SURPs can be 
seen to flow through to union organising which stimulated EA-U. Thus, in Table 3, the 
periods 1998-2000 and 2002-06 are noticeable by virtue of higher levels of EA-U 
compared with the pre-1998 period while in Table 2, the period 2003-06 is noticeable 
for attempts to gain new UR. But, as with in Britain, the level of EA-U falls off towards 
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the end because of, on the one hand, union fatigue and paucity of union resource in 
mounting UR campaigns, and paradoxically on the other, the decline in the proportion 
of more amenable employers.  
 
Table 3: Union Tactics and Employer Tactics in Recognition Campaigns  
 Year 
Strike 
(strike 
threat) Works council 
Direct  
communi-
cation 
Selective sackings 
/closure threat 
Stone-
walling/ 
access denied 
Company  
Ballot 
Year 
total 
Number of   
new  voluntary 
UR deals 
1995 1  (0) 1 1 0 3 0 6 2 
1996 1 (1) 1 3 0 3 0 9 1 
1997  1 (0)  1  1 2   5  0 10  1 
1998  1 (3)  2  1 4  12  1  24  2 
1999  6 (1)  2  1 2  10  0 22  2 
2000  4 (1)  2  1 2  10  0 20  2 
2001  0 (4)  1  0 0   6  0 11  3 
2002  4 (3)  3 2  2  11  0 25  3 
2003  7 (1)  3 3 1  14  0 29  6 
2004  0 (1)  5 3   0  6  2 17  10 
2005  0 (2)  7 3  1  7  0 20  4 
2006  1 (2) 3 4 1 6  0 17  3 
2007  1 (2) 2 3 1 5  0 15  2 
Totals 30 (21) 33 27 16 98  3 228 41 
Note: N=126 employing organisations, so that each organisation may have used more than one tactic 
(N=177). 
 
 
Employer Anti-Unionism in the US  
The extent and depth of EA-U to UR campaigns is legendary in spite of the existence of a 
SURP since 1935. For example, between 1993 and 2003, an average of 22,633 workers 
pa were ordered to receive back pay from their employers for being fired or 
discriminated against for their union activities or sympathies (American Rights at Work 
2006, see also Cooke 1985b)8. This equates to some 28% of employers faced with UR 
elections sacking union activists/members/sympathisers (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
                                                          
8 Data on discrimination against labour unionists is derived from NLRB figures, where some 90% 
of cases are concerned with organising drives (Cooke 1985b) and NLRB certification elections 
represent some 80% of all attempts to gain UR.  
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1998:22). Even though reinstatement is ordered, subsequently many are hounded out 
of their jobs (Kleiner 1984). Now, and despite tremendous difficulties in the voluntary 
arena, some unions assert that using the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
procedures is entirely counter-productive because it provides EA-U with so many 
opportunities, and with virtual impunity, to defeat their attempts. Rather, these unions 
now seek to build up substantial union membership before requesting neutrality 
agreements from employers prior to voluntary card checks or voluntary ballots (Fiorito 
2003, Jordan and Bruno 2006). And, moreover, unions have campaigned for and 
sponsored legislation on several occasions (the Labour Law Reform Act (1977-8) and 
Employee Free Choice Act (2007-9)) to make the SURP more ‘union friendly’. Union 
density has risen and then fallen from 32% in 1953 to 12% in 2008, with density in the 
private sector peaking at 36% in 1953 and falling to 7% in 2006 (Moody 2007:100). 
 
The creation of the SURP can be likened to a ‘reform from above’ rather than a 
‘revolution from below’ in that the labour movement, then represented by the 
conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) did not campaign for nor advocate 
such a proposal. Rather, National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) formed part of the ‘New 
Deal’ programme, seeking to institutionalise workplace conflict and promote workplace 
cooperation and industrial democracy. More widely, the ‘New Deal’ sought to reject 
unitarism and neoclassical economics and move towards pluralism and Keynesian with 
the purpose being to create social justice and peace, stabilise and expand the economy, 
and cohere society (Cohen and Cohen 1948, Clawson 2003, Clawson and Clawson 1999, 
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Fiorito 2003, Gross 1985, Kochan et al. 1984, Renshaw 1991, Roomkin 1981). In this 
light, the ‘New Deal’ can be viewed as a centralised, top-down organised 
accommodation, introduced without extensive tripartite means, between the interests 
of capital and labour and led by a distinct political force (cf. those class accommodations 
in Scandinavia in the same epoch which were derived from intense capital-labour 
conflict and tripartite talks). Moreover, the labour movement would have been unable, 
had it wished, to compel the creation of a SURP because of its industrial and political 
weakness at this point (cf. 1935-1955 with the rise of the Congress of Industrial 
Organisations (CIO)). Thus, the NLRA did not represent an attempt by organised labour 
to regain its former influence for organised labour had not yet reached its historical 
apex of strength. Indeed, helped by the NLRA, and in tandem with the militancy and 
mobilising power of the CIO and the expansion of the economy from the early 1940s 
onwards, organised labour reached its historical apex between 1960 and 1970 (Kochan 
1980, Moody 1986). 
 
The salience of this sketch is that the introduction of a SURP did not provide an 
immediate, substantial fillip to industrial EA-U. Indeed, EA-U appears to be greater and 
more violent prior to 1935, and while there was employer resistance (Gross 1981:7-9, 
13, 17-18), its main form was initially political and legal redress (Gross 1974, 1981), 
following imposition upon a generally unwilling party – non-union employers - within a 
changed and less hospitable political environment. Consequently, this strategic 
orientation, which suppressed industrial EA-U, stood on the basis of vehement 
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contemporary anti-unionism, which was of hypothetical, potential and actual types (see 
Bendix 1956:267-274, Bernstein 1960). Although SURP cases are not synonymous with 
all cases of UR campaigns, in its early years of operation the degree of synonymousness 
was very high (Logan 2001:65). Compared to later on, the marked feature of the NLRA’s 
early period (1935-1947) was a relatively low level of elections (<3,000) but with a high 
(>75%) rate of success (Fulmer 1982:182-183). The former reflected limitations on union 
organising capacity while the later reflected the nature of the period, whereby the move 
towards a collectivist ideology and welfare capitalism, organised labour’s  growing 
strength, the expansion of the economy, rising rates of profitability and the ‘unifying’ 
impact of the Second World War (WWII) inclined employers, generally speaking, 
towards accommodation rather than opposition (although this may not have been the 
case if more UR elections were faced).  
 
Nonetheless, the significance of this political opposition to the NLRA from various 
pressure groups, the press, employers and politicians (Adams 1999, Cohen and Cohen 
1948, Gross 1995, Kochan et al. 1984, Logan 2001, Moody 1986, Renshaw 1991) lay in 
its portent for future years. While the Smith Bill of 1940, which was intended to 
undermine the 1935 settlement, became stillborn as a result of WWII, the NLRA 
experienced a counter-offensive after the enforced social peace of WWII ended in the 
form of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 1947 and Landrum Griffin 
Act 1959 (Gross 1981). These not only weakened NLRA but their spirit fed through to 
NLRB (Gross 1981, 1985, Fiorito 2003, Kochan 1980), whereby employers were expressly 
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authorised to oppose UR and penalties against management ULPs were so low as to be 
ineffective deterrents (cf. Abelow 1958, Cohen and Cohen 1948). Nevertheless, actual 
EA-U was still marked (see Bernstein 1970, Zeiger 1997), testifying to latitude of action 
amongst employers per se.   
 
From 1950 onwards, the number of UR elections rose from c5,600pa to a high point of 
c8,500 in 1973 (although not steadily) before falling back to c7,000 in 1980 (Fulmer 
1982:2). There was a particularly sharp fall from 1980 (7,296) to 1983 (3,492) (Moody 
1986:124). Previously, there were 1,100 elections in 1940 (Lipset and Katchanovski 
2001:237) while by 1997 the number had fallen to under 3,300 in 1997 and to just over 
2,100 by 2006. A general consensus exists that EA-U has had a significant if unspecified 
role in reducing the number of UR elections (these themselves stemming from prior 
petitions and a priori union assessment of success). Meanwhile, the success rate for 
unions in recognition elections fell fairly evenly from 74% in 1950 to 49% in 1980 
(Fulmer 1982:2). Indeed, the decline in the success rate is even more remarkable when 
one considers that it was as high as 94% in 1937 (Fulmer 1982:182) and fell to 46% in 
1985 before moving back up to around 50% in many of years from the early 1990s 
onwards (Jordan and Bruno 2006:182, Lipset and Katchanovski 2001:237, see also Cooke 
1983:402 and Freeman 1986:45).9 The number of alleged management ULPs increased 
from c3,000 in 1937 to c30,000 by 1979 (see also Roomkin 1981:246 and Meyer and 
Cooke 1993:553). After reaching a high point in the early 1980s, the number of ULPs fell 
                                                          
9 Concurrently, the number of workers covered by these wins has continued to fall significantly.  
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back somewhat before reaching a new high in 1997 (see McCammon 2001:144). This 
overall upward trajectory led Freeman and Kleiner (1990:351) to comment that ULPs 
had ‘skyrocketed’ in the 1970s and 1980s. According to Flanagan (2005:48), these ULPs 
fell back a little by 1999 (cf. Logan 2001:67). Both Kleiner (2001:522) and Logan 
(2002:198) also reported on the huge growth in anti-union consultants between late 
1960s and early 1980s. Another way of looking at these issues can be gained by 
considering the percentages of NLRB elections that were not contested by employers. 
These fell from 47% in 1963 to 8% in 1978 (Seeber and Cooke 1983:43).  
 
Concomitant, the percentage of successful recognition elections not leading to a first 
collective bargaining contract rose from 20%-25% in the 1970s to 33%-37% in 1980s 
(Cooke 1985a:164, Clawson and Clawson 1999:103, Freeman and Kleiner 1990:351, 
McDonald 1986:61 (see also Pavy (1994) and Jordan and Bruno (2006:183)). Kleiner 
(2001:524) reported a rise in ‘bad faith’ bargaining from less than 2,000 cases pa in 1950 
to over 10,000 in the 1990s. Freeman and Medoff (1984:240) also noted that 
decertification elections, although remaining relatively infrequent vis-à-vis UR elections 
and often initiated by employers, picked up from 1970s (see also Logan 2001:66). 
Although not uncontested (Dickens 1983, Fiorito 2001, 2002, Freeman and Kleiner 1990, 
Keoller 1992, and Farber and Krueger 1993, Lipset and Katchanovski 2001, Flanagan 
2005), Freeman (1986:54-61), surveying the extant research, argued that ‘managerial 
opposition matters’, contributing between 25% to 50% of the explanation for union 
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losses in UR elections where management ULPs were used (Freeman 1986:59) while 
others like Gross (1995:279) went further.  
 
To summarise, the most widespread EA-U took place well after the SURP’s introduction, 
suggesting either the introduction of mechanism did not itself produce this anticipated 
outcome or the anticipated outcome was deflected and delayed rather than dissipated. 
Generally speaking, the employers were either not inclined to oppose the growing 
number of UR campaigns because it was politically and industrially inopportune, and/or 
the threat posed by UR to their interests was insufficient to warrant such opposition. 
Various commentators have supported an interpretation. The first view attaches 
significance to organised labour’s growing power and the settled nature of the pluralist 
and Keynesian political accord in moulding employer behaviour. The second view 
attaches significance to the economic expansion and growing rates of profitability that 
capital enjoyed. There is, however, disagreement amongst such commentators as to 
when the turning point took place with regard to significant change in these 
environmental factors. For example, Dubofsky (1994), Gould (1994) and Klein and 
Wanger (1986) favoured the late 1940s/1950s while Clawson (2003:37), McCammon 
(2001), Meyer and Cooke (1993) and Moody (1986, 2007), for example, cited the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Thus, differences exist over the influence of the Taft-Hartley Act 1947 
and the developing case law (Kochan et al. 1986:33). The case of Dubosky et al. rests 
largely on the ending of the wartime enforced social peace and slowing down of 
economic growth while the case of Clawson et al. rests largely on the ending of 
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economic growth and profitability. Meanwhile, Gross (1995), and others like Logan 
(2001) and Towers (1999), suggested that the level of EA-U grew steadily and 
exponentially from 1935. Gross (1995:202,240,278) outlined the emergence in the 
1960s of the Labor Law Reform project marking the beginning of organised and 
widespread political counter-mobilisation, while the defeat of Labor Reform Act in 1978 
represented another ratcheting up of EA-U. 
 
Discussion  
There are four areas now worthy of discussion; applicability of the contention, the 
generic nature of SURPs, the ramifications of the capital-labour-state relationship, and 
the agency of management. 
  
The first concerns the case of the US. It is not so much the exception to, or that proves, 
the ‘rule’ but rather a reminder that a general rule is merely that and should, thus, be 
applied with sensitivity to specific situations. So while in the US, organised labour did 
not campaign for, never mind achieve a SURP, it did significantly benefit from one up to 
a point - that being when employers decided that it was opportune and/or necessary 
time to mount widespread resistance. Thus, political and economic circumstances 
conditioned employers’ response both in terms of when they did and did not resist 
industrially. But once EA-U to UR through the SURP was deemed possible and necessary, 
it was routinely engaged in. The situation in Britain and Eire is a variation of this theme: 
weakened labour movements were sufficiently influential to gain weak SURPs thus 
stimulating the generation of EA-U. Thus, employers were insufficiently strong politically 
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to prevent the creation of a SURP but they were sufficiently strong politically to 
influence its complexion and sufficiently strong industrially to limit its impact through 
EA-U. However, in Eire, with a very weak SURP, it is reasonable to suggest counter-
factually that EA-U there would have been greater had a British-type SURP been 
introduced. Two other qualifications are warranted. First, that in relative terms and with 
regard to Britain (and probably Eire), EA-U prior to the introduction of a SURP is greater 
than after its introduction for non-union employers recognised there was more latitude 
for it prior to the introduction of the new regulatory regime and less afterwards. But 
even here EA-U after the introduction of a SURP is still significant and leads to less UR 
campaigns being mounted. Second, SURPs lead to unions focusing and structuring their 
UR activity in such a way (sic) that puts a greater premium on EA-U targeted at potential 
and actual situations of UR activity.  
 
Second, and with that said, it is not just that the particular procedural nature of SURPs 
that leads to EA-U as some (Adams 1999, Logan 2001) have suggested but their 
existence per se, albeit guided by the balance of prevailing political and economic 
forces. Their existence is be taken by some non-union employers as an affront to their 
self-ordained rights as capital, and they have the means by which to resist (albeit that 
the battle to determine the procedural complexion of SURPs is still important for 
employers for this can make their task of resisting more, or less, easy). However, what is 
salient about the nature of SURPs is that they are of an enabling and not automatic 
nature, whereby UR is granted where specific conditions and thresholds are met, and 
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are inserted into voluntarist regimes where the power and resources imbalance at work 
between labour and capital is reified. Thus, employers are invariably free to deny union 
access to workers and free to intimidate, cajole and coerce their workers into refusing 
to entertain a union. Consequently, such non-union employers are able to deploy 
substitution and suppression tactics to not only defeat UR campaigns but the pre-
figurative stage of workers joining of unions. Moreover, such wilfully non-interventionist 
regimes make workers susceptible to EA-U as workplace unionism is nascent here. This 
means it is unable to create the required degree of independent resources quickly 
enough through increasing membership and establishing organisation to resist and 
outflank these non-union employers.  
 
Third, prior to the campaigning for and the introduction of SURPs in Britain and Eire, 
workplace and national unionisms had reached their post-war zeniths, aided by 
expanding economic growth, oppositional ideologies and not unsupportive wider 
government policies. The move from vibrant, powerful and coherent mobilising 
organisations to atrophied, vanquished and fragmented organisations led to the 
national labour movements reassessing their own voluntarist traditions. In the US, the 
SURP helped labour unionism expand and develop when set alongside and infused with 
the impact of expanding economic growth, oppositional ideologies and not 
unsupportive wider government policies. In this vein, the contrast of the third SURP in 
Britain with the first and second versions (1971-4, 1976-9) is instructive to 
understanding some of the underlying dynamics of the context of the present version. 
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The first version was hardly used at all because it resulted from a government initiative 
against the wishes of labour unionism, which was fearful of legal intervention and at its 
apex of strength (Gall 2003:15). Meanwhile, the second and stronger version resulted 
from a social contract between unions and Labour government whereby a new state 
arbitration and conciliation agency was established. It elicited a still small (albeit much 
greater) usage than the first because of continued union strength and preference for 
voluntary means (Gall 2003:15-16). Where binding recommendations were made, 
refusal to adhere by employers was common and graphically illustrated in a labour 
cause celebre case (of Grunwick). By contrast, in Eire, although the constitutional right 
to form and join unions has long existed, declining power under a voluntarist workplace 
regulatory regime has compelled unions to campaign for a SURP. Consequently, the 
complexion and operation of SURPs needs to be located in different spatial and 
temporal dimensions of power and ideology in regard of capital, labour and the state. 
 
Following from this, the major inference to be drawn here is that labour unionism’s 
pursuit of SURPs as a means of revitalisation is futile if too much emphasis is placed on 
the renewing power of SURPs alone because they are merely one aspect of the wider 
environment in which unions operate. Concentrating on improving public policy and 
wider employment legislation is also vital to enhance the prowess of a SURP for SURPs, 
in the first instance, channel existing labour union strength rather than augment it. 
Other levers of industrial and economic power of labour unionism (Batstone 1988) need 
to be developed to counter the power of capital for SURPs not only reflect but can 
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reinforce and reify (rather than alter) its hegemonic power, interests and ideology in 
society. This is because, on the one hand, governments (and states) of whatever hue 
cannot be neutral or independent of capital under capitalism and, on the other, capital 
seeks to use its superior resources to defend its interests in whatever arenas it deems 
necessary to do so in. Consequently, a policy of developing industrial militancy may 
present a productive means to supplement other modus operandi. 
 
Fourth, data analysis of employer EA-U against UR in both Britain and Eire10 shows no 
clear pattern by workforce size, multi-site status, nationality of employer origin 
(primarily ‘indigenous’ versus ‘foreign’), economic sector, market share or profitability 
(or by bunches of variables). This lack of differential association between any of these 
categories and preponderance to engage in EA-U against UR, regardless for the moment 
of issues concerning order of causation, suggests that the source and context of the 
decision to engage in EA-U is to be located elsewhere. So one plausible explanatory 
variable here might then be management ideology, whether broadly pluralist or 
unitarist. However, this is too blunt a variable, particularly because it is unable to 
identify context and causation, such as whether the extant management ideology is the 
property of the employer or the particular management in post, or whether it arises as 
result of previous experience of unions (in general or in the individual salient case at 
hand) or general views of unions. Unfortunately, the research data was unable to shed 
light on these issues because this level of detail was absent as a result of the research 
                                                          
10 Such an analysis in the case of the US data was not possible because the NLRB data lacks such 
contextual depth. 
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methods used. Nonetheless, it appears as a plausible differentiating variable, indicating 
that not all employers approach the issue in the same way. Equally plausible too as a 
salient variable would be the strength of UR campaigns. In both Britain and Eire, 
members of the bodies responsible for administering the SURPS have reported that 
resisting employers have tended to oppose UR relatively more vehemently where there 
was a strong chance of statutory UR being granted. In other words, on a temporal cost-
benefit analysis, employers deduced that resistance was appropriate. This point might 
be true also for the voluntary sphere for UR. Again, this would highlight the importance 
of management room for discretion as well as choices then made and the consequent 
action, albeit that choices can vary, leading to varying actions. This brief discussion 
highlights the importance of considering management not only as a conscious actor with 
choices mediated by environmental factors but also as an actor informed by the 
dialectic between ideology, pragmatism and power relations. 
 
Conclusion 
The contention of this paper was that SURPs in the three Anglo-Saxon economies 
stimulated extant but diffuse EA-U as a form of employer counter-mobilisation in a 
number of ways. At first sight, the evidence presented for Britain and Eire seems to 
support the contention, with the outcome of EA-U varying in specific context and degree 
but not in kind. Yet because this was demonstrated in an overall, suggestive manner, 
with only implied (rather than demonstrated) cause and effect, this deduction must 
necessarily remain a tentative one. Moreover, the limited timeframes for the study of 
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Britain and Eire, in comparison to the US, heighten this degree of tentativeness further. 
Notwithstanding the separate and different genesis of the US SURP, the case of the US 
here is interesting. First, it can be taken to give support to a more sophisticated version 
of the contention where temporal and situational factors are allowed to play their 
appropriate part. Second, there is continuing debate over which social and political 
forces led - and supported - the ‘New Deal’ reforms (including its SURP) and why.  
Swenson (2002, 2004) argued in favour of analysis based on a particular alignment of 
dominant cross-class forces coming together in a specific moment in time and for 
specific reasons. This is applicable to both Britain and Eire in as much as the creation of 
SURPs also represented the temporal and situational coming together of certain social 
forces to collectively exert their will in the form of a compromise outcome, rather than 
one group holding a proverbial gun to the head of another to enforce its will. The added 
salience of Swenson’s analysis is that he also differentiated between varying segments 
of employers by interests and preferences on a relatively contingent basis to show that 
dissimilar responses existed to aspects of the ‘New Deal’. Taking this notion of 
segmentation and applying it to the SURPs of Britain, Eire and the US, it is apparent that 
either not all non-union employers are predisposed to EA-U or that not all non-union 
employers are  preordained to engage in EA-U. Indeed, the point is emphasised by the 
issue of the self-selecting nature of the deployed data where population samples – 
which would have been able to show the relative proportions of different types of non-
union employer responses like acceptance as well as resistance – could not be 
constructed. But it remains the case that there is sufficient support for the contention of 
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this paper to warrant further research into the specific nature of the environmental 
context and order of causation between the creation of a SURP and change in behaviour 
of a sizeable number of non-union employers. This would form part of developing a 
better explanation of why informs non-union employers to act in different ways as well 
as why there are majority and minority employer responses.   
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